Category Archives: General

Stock price reflexivity

Investors learn the parable of Mr. Market early in their education. The lesson that Benjamin Graham tried to teach is that investors shouldn’t value a company based on what the – possibly irrational – market is telling them, but on their own merit. Taking the teachings of Benjamin Graham to heart many value investors more or less ignore market prices. While this is roughly right in a lot of cases it misses the reflexivity between intrinsic value and price. A business with a higher price is often worth more than an otherwise identical business with a lower price.

Stock as currency (in deals)

One reason for this phenomenon is that overvalued companies can use their stock as a cheap currency. This allows a company to do acquisitions that really add to the intrinsic value/share. Let’s say a hypothetical company is worth $10 million, but it is trading at $20 million with one million shares outstanding. It could double its share count and acquire a second business worth $20 million. The result would be an increase in intrinsic value/share from $10/share to $15/share while the overvaluation shrinks from 100% to just 33%.

And a fair question to ask in this case: is the stock really trading above intrinsic value if the company is able to do deals like this? And if it’s trading above intrinsic value, by how much? I would argue that the true intrinsic value – taking into account reflexivity – is higher than $10/share. But how much it is worth exactly depends on how long the music keeps playing. The company could in fact be worth a lot more than $20/share if it is able to do a bunch of favorable acquisitions. I would never be long a stock based on this idea, but it is worth thinking about when you are shorting!

Share based compensation

Closely related to the example above is the use of stock as a currency to pay management and employees. A higher stock price is better for investors because share based compensation is usually based on the monetary value of the underlying. If you invest in nano-caps (like I do) you might be significantly diluted because of the option package that is granted to insiders. It might not be an insane bonus in absolute terms, but when a companies market cap is minuscule a share based payment could be a quick way to see your stake shrink.

When a company is overvalued and you consider shorting a stock the share based compensation is also an issue to think about. Many web 2.0 stocks have a sky-high valuation and pay employees using their (according to some) overpriced stock. If they are able to continue that practice it makes the business better than it otherwise would be.

‘Low-ball’ offers

If you own a stock that you think is extremely undervalued there is a very real risk that you are unable to benefit fully from that insight. A stock that is worth $50/share but is trading at $10/share is a great target for a management buyout or an acquisition from some other party. If you are, as the acquiring party, able to offer a significant premium above the latest trading price there is a very high probability that you will be able to close the deal. If shareholders wouldn’t be happy to sell a $10-stock at $20 it wouldn’t be trading at $10.

This is one of the many reasons that I’m happy to share my investment idea’s on this blog. Once I have bought a stock I don’t think a dropping share price is just a great opportunity to double down. Doubling down might still be a great idea, but it is a double-edged sword since you also run an increased risk of a take-over at an unfavorable price.

Share repurchases

A higher share price does not always translate to a higher intrinsic value: the reverse is also a common occurrence. Some companies buy back stock irrespective of the current market price. When the market price is below intrinsic value this is great for remaining shareholders, but when the stock is overvalued this is not good news. In that case value is transferred from remaining stockholders to selling stockholders. A company with a smarter share repurchase policy is also more valuable when its stock is undervalued: it cannot create value if it doesn’t have the opportunity to repurchase undervalued shares.

Closing thoughts

While the reflexivity between price and value is an interesting phenomenon I don’t think you can do a whole lot with this knowledge. You still want to buy undervalued companies and short overvalued companies. But it should have a place in your process when you think about the risks and rewards of various investments. Both short and long investments offer less upside than you would have thought when taking reflexivity into account. How much? I don’t know.

Ring Mirror - Arnaud Lapierre

Short Google Drive tutorial based on the FFP spreadsheet

FFP released their semi-annual results last Friday which prompted me to update my Google Drive spreadsheet that tracks the NAV of the company in real-time. The spreadsheet is publicly accessible using this link and currently looks as follows:

FFP NAV spreadsheet

In the past months NAV/share has been going up while the discount has been getting a bit smaller, so that’s obviously good news for me, but that is not what I want to talk about. What I want to focus on is on how you can create a spreadsheet like this with real time prices, and specifically how to incorporate price data when the standard =GoogleFinance() function is unavailable. This is a recurring issue when you use Google Drive because foreign exchanges are often not supported. The FFP spreadsheet ran into this problem for the first time because FFP now owns Peugeot warrants and it has made an investment in a Mauritius listed stock.

The easy way

Step one in adding a quote that is not supported by Google Drive is finding a webpage that does have a quote. Bloomberg.com or ft.com are often a good source for foreign stocks. With the =ImportHTML() function it easy to grab data from a webpage. It is limited since it can only get stuff that is presented in a table or a list on the webpage, but luckily Bloomberg does have some relevant stuff in a table. To grab for example the latest price for Fujimak (A Japanese company I own) you can use the following command:

=ImportHTML("http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/5965:JP", "table", 1)

The first argument specifies on what web page the data can be found, the second argument specifies if you want to grab it from a list or a table and the last argument specifies the number of the table or list (there are often a couple of different tables on one page). Because Bloomberg doesn’t have a quote for the Peugeot warrants nor for the CIEL group on its website we have to take a slightly more complicated path.

The hard way: CIEL Group

If you want to be able to access everything you can use the =ImportXML() function. It takes two arguments: an URL and a XPath query. The XPath language can be used to select nodes in a HTML document (plenty of tutorials available online), but we don’t need a lot of fancy stuff to find a quote. You could use "\\div" as a XPath and you would basically get the whole HTML page dumped in your spreadsheet. This isn’t a very neat solution because there is a high risk that something will change in the page and that the cell that contains the latest price is suddenly moved: breaking the spreadsheet. The better solution is to specifically search for the HTML element that contains the price.

The latest price of the CIEL group can be found here on the site of the Mauritius stock exchange. Right-click in Google Chrome on the price and select “inspect element” and you will see a bunch of HTML code with one highlighted line, a div with the id “general_price_details”:

Finding the div id

We can now select this specific element with the following XPath query:

=ImportXML(B19, "//div[@id='general_price_details']")

Getting the warrant price

The price for the Peugeot warrants can be found on the site of the Euronext stock exchange. Here things are made even a bit more complex because the website is designed in such a way that the price is loaded asynchronously with the main page.  We can once again use the Google Chrome development tools to figure out where the data is coming from.

Right-click on any page element and select “inspect element”. Select the “Network” tab and refresh the page by pressing F5. You will see a list of all kinds of files that are loaded by your browser when the page is rendered. Most of the files are small images, scripts and style sheets, but there is also a small HTML page that contains the price data. We need to copy the URL of this page to Google Drive for our =ImportXML() function:

Finding the page with the Peugeot warrants  price

We can now import the price in Google Drive using this command (B3 refers to the URL):

=ImportXML(B3, "//div[@class='quote with-label']")

There remains one tricky issue that needs to be resolved. Google tries to automatically convert the price data to a number, but the Euronext website uses a comma as a decimal mark while Google drive expects a point. When the price is for example €1,641 Google drive translates this to €1641 (and it is easily fixed by a division by one thousand). If the price is €1,64 Drive doesn’t recognize a number, and we need to remove the €-sign and convert the comma to a point our self. This can be done with the following command:

=VALUE(RIGHT(REGEXREPLACE(D3, ",", "."), 5))

Hopefully this was educational!

Disclosure

Author is long FFP

How I generate my ideas

How I generate my ideas is probably the question I get asked the most. So I figured I should do a blog post to answer this once and for all. The honest answer is that I usually don’t really generate any idea’s: I simply wait for someone else to write-up a convincing thesis. I thought that this was pretty obvious because a lot of my write-ups start with something along the lines of “Previous week blogger X took a look at company Y…”. The handful of blogs that are displayed at the right-hand side of this post are a major source of inspiration, and I follow another 50 blogs or so as well using Feedly.

Blogs are of course not my only source of ideas. I also follow a bunch of authors on Seeking Alpha and I follow even more people on Twitter. There are also a couple of funds that I follow (again using Feedly) and the great thing about running a blog yourself is that people often e-mail interesting idea’s as well. Like minded investors are in my opinion a great screen for potential idea’s.

Buffett is known for advising people to simply start with the A’s and look at everything while a stock screener is also a popular method to find potential interesting companies. I rarely do this. I have no doubt that this can be successful as well, but I doubt that it is a time effective method. When you look at everything you also spend a lot of time looking at stuff that isn’t even remotely attractive. When you use a screener you often run in data quality issues for micro caps and foreign stocks, and another problem is that usually the cheapest stocks don’t show up on a screener. I’ll happily let my fellow investors do the heavy lifting.

The number of ideas that I can research is limited, and by mostly looking at stocks that like minded investors find interesting I think I’m significantly increasing the odds that I’m looking at a company worth investing in. You don’t get points for originality as an investor. The only score that matters is the risk-adjusted return that you are able to achieve.

I also think that a lot of investors have a bit of a misplaced believe that they need to buy something that is truly undiscovered, and that going through all stocks or using a screener is a way to accomplish that. But the reality is that a stock is almost never undiscovered. Unless you are buying in an IPO there is always a group of people that already know the stock and own the stock. Doesn’t matter how obscure a company is: there is probably someone out there that has owned it for years and knows everything there is to know about it.

What should be noted is that while I almost always borrow my ideas from someone else I never invest without doing my own research 100%. When I find a potential interesting company I always start my research from scratch. If you don’t read the annual reports yourself you don’t know what someone else might have missed, and when you don’t built your own valuation model you don’t know what kind of assumption were exactly used. It’s in my opinion critically important to fully understand the investment thesis. If you don’t it will be hard to interpreted news releases and to decide what to do when the price changes. Do you have the conviction to buy more when the price drops but intrinsic value remains constant? Is it even possible to know what happened to intrinsic value without fully understanding your investment? Seems like a though task to me.

Some thoughts about (il)liquidity

The biggest common factor that connects the stocks in my portfolio is that they are all (relative) illiquid. If you have two almost identical assets, one liquid and one illiquid, the most attractive asset is obviously the liquid one because illiquidity is a real risk:

  1. You can never be totally certain that you don’t need money on short notice.
  2. An illiquid stock also makes it hard to profit from superior insight. For example: you can’t turn on a dime and exit when you change your mind.

The question of course if how much you want to be paid for illiquidity risk, and how much the market is willing to pay you for that risk. In my opinion you shouldn’t be paid a whole lot to take on illiquidity risk. The main reason is that stocks are only a suitable investment if you have a long-term horizon. But why would you need intraday liquidity if you are holding an asset for a multi-year period? The answer is simple: you don’t! The value of being able to trade out of your position in a few microseconds is negligible when your intention is to hold it for years or even decades.

So if the market is willing to pay you a significant premium for holding an illiquid asset it’s a deal you should take, and there is a lot of academic research that suggests that the illiquidity premium is sizable. The paper “Liquidity as an Investment Style” contains to following table that shows that low liquidity stocks outperform irrespective of size:

Size and Liquidity Quartile Portfolios, 1972–2011

As is visible the difference in performance is huge. Especially when we look at the microcap segment where it is a whopping 14% per annum while taking less risk at the same time (if we accept the standard deviation as a risk measure). I don’t know if I’m able to add alpha to my portfolio. I of course think that I do, but by structuring my portfolio in a such a way that I have exposure to factors that have outperformed in the past I’m hedging my bets. Besides a bet on illiquidity my portfolio is of course also a bet on small-sized firms and value stocks.

And the big question is of course: can we expect that the illiquidity premium persists in the future? I think that it will because of how the financial services industry is structured. Most individual investors don’t really need very liquid assets because they do have a long-term horizon. But they do park their money in ETF’s, mutual funds and hedge funds, and the managers of those funds can’t afford to buy illiquid assets. They never know when their investors want to withdraw, so they always have to plan for the worst.

As an individual investor you don’t face this risk, and because of that illiquid assets are a great match if you want to generate high returns over a long-term horizon. I think that is (or should be) the goal of most investors, but as long as they don’t realize what they are implicitly paying for the liquidity they don’t use they will be at a disadvantage.

Disclosure

Author is long a lot of (relative) illiquid stuff

Urbana Corp: one year later

Urbana has been one of the first stocks I wrote about on this blog, and it’s also one of the few investments I have realized a loss on. But after selling my position at the end of last year the fund has gained more than 100%, and a reader asked me a question worth a blog post: “Are you still happy with your decision making process? Should you have had more patience? Should you have re-bought when the company started repurchasing shares again?”

Urbana trading history

Background

I have a lot of new readers since discussing Urbana for the first time, so to summarize the story: Urbana is basically a closed-end fund with the majority of holdings in a few publicly listed financial companies (mostly exchanges, but more recently also banks). When I first bought Urbana it was trading at a ~45% discount to NAV, and buying back ~10% of the outstanding shares/year. Because closed-end funds incur overhead and management costs they should trade at a discount, but when you can buy back your own shares at a substantial discount you also make a lot of easy money. Because of the buy backs I estimated that a fair discount should be between 15% and 20%. Despite this estimate I sold almost a year later while the fund was still trading at a 45% discount.

What happened since?

Urbana is now trading at a 33% discount and NAV/share is up 70%: combine these two factors and you are looking at a >100% return that I missed. I didn’t have a strong opinion on the value of the assets that Urbana owned a year ago, or what they own today. The big increase in NAV/share is in my opinion mostly a random result, and a big contributor to the good result was their position in NYX that was acquired at a premium this year by ICE.

Shrinking of the discount

I don’t feel bad that I didn’t anticipate the good performance of the fund, but at the same time it does show that my initial thesis was roughly correct. Investor sentiment does change, and when you buy something at a big discount there is a decent probability that you can sell it at a smaller discount at some point in the future. It’s not a surprise that this occurs at the same time as the outperformance versus the market (even when it is just a random good year). Closed-end funds just seem very inefficiently priced: when the underlying assets are hot investors are willing to pay a premium, and when they are out of fashion the fund starts trading at a discount. This doesn’t make a lot of sense since changes in value are already reflected in the market prices of the underlying assets: there shouldn’t be a huge variability in the discount itself.

So why did I sell?

I haven’t really changed my thinking about closed-end fund discounts between two years ago, and today. The reason I sold Urbana was a combination of factors that made me believe that a bigger discount than I originally calculated was warranted.

  • Management was investing money in questionable assets: the amount of money invested in this wasn’t big, but when I saw that the fund manager was putting money in leveraged gold ETF’s I thought my assumption of neutral alpha might be too optimistic. I still think this is true: portfolio turnover jumped from 5% in 2011 to 22% in 2012, and the trading expense ratio jumped from 0.08% to 0.63%.
  • Management started investing in a private company that had Urbana’s CEO as a major shareholder. I still think that’s super sketchy.
  • The company was buying back 10%/year of the non-voting class A shares. With the share count of this class getting lower the percentage of outstanding shares that is bought back each year is shrinking. Instead of 10%/year it’s now closer to 8%/year.
  • They use a little bit of leverage, and the interest they pay on their margin loan is relative high. As a small private investor I can borrow on margin a couple hundred basis points cheaper than them.

So when they stopped buying back shares at the end of 2012 that was the proverbial drop that made the cup run over. Every single negative in the list above isn’t huge, but they all add up, and do make Urbana less attractive. I also think that the fact that Urbana resumed the share buybacks doesn’t mean that I was really wrong.

The big question is: what would they have done if NAV/share would have continued to deteriorate? Management had stated that they didn’t want to reduce the size of the fund too much, and the fact that almost no shares were bought back at the end of 2012 when they were trading at all-time lows seems to support that possibility. I think the timing of the repurchases are a further indicator that management isn’t value neutral. They are now buying back shares at full speed while the underlying is up and the discount is smaller.

Conclusion

The above might all sound very negative, but you have to realize that most of those negatives are just minor compared to how big a 45% discount was. But those negatives were enough of a reason to think that I could find a more attractive idea, and I don’t regret my decision to sell just before the big run-up. If I would have had the choice to put either 100% of my money in the S&P 500, or 95% in the S&P 500 and 5% in Urbana I would have gone for the latter, but with many more options available I thought I could find something better.

In hindsight I would have wished I would have been a bit more patience, but I don’t think I made a bad decision. I was just a bit unlucky to miss some positive variance. With value stocks you often buy something cheap, and you just bet that at some indeterminate point in time something will happen that will realize that value. In the case of Urbana that catalyst came early with a great result, but there were many more possible outcomes that were less favorable. Would they have continued buybacks if NAV/share remained low? What would have happened if the underlying assets didn’t outperform this year? What would have happened if the market itself didn’t have a great 2013? The shrinkage of the discount could just as easily have taken 5 or 10 years, and the value of the underlying assets could have gone down as well as up.

Looking at the good results from 2013 is in my opinion simply a form of results oriented thinking. Urbana was a slightly above average investment, but not a great pick. If I made a mistake it was investing in it in the first place.

Disclosure

No positions in any stock mentioned